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Abstract
One of the key-metaphor complexes in conceptualizing national
identity is that of the nation as a body or a person, especially
in English-speaking cultures, as evidenced in the lexicalization of
phrases such as body politic, head of state). It has a long conceptual his-
tory and still figures prominently in present-day political discourse,
both in Inner Circle English-speaking countries and internationally.
It thus seems to show considerable semantic stability; however, it
is still an open question whether the use of BODY-or PERSON-based
metaphors in international Englishmeans that recipients in different
cultures understand thesemetaphors uniformly. This paper discusses
empirical evidence from an international interpretation survey
that shows substantial variation in conceptualization of the nation
as a body, with five main conceptual scenarios (NATION AS BODY,
NATION’S TERRITORY AS BODY, NATION AS BODY PART, NATION AS
PART OF EGO and NATION AS PERSON).
1 INTRODUCTION
(1) The head of the [British nation’s] body represents the Queen of England, as she is in charge of the whole country
and she is royalty. The features of the head (eyes, nose, mouth and ears) represent the different official people,
such as politicians, the PrimeMinister, the Government.
(2) New Zealand is a young body, small and kind of rugged. She is wild, her hair messy, dirt under her fingernails, Her
appearance is somewhat messy, relaxed. She doesn’t wear shoes.
These two excerpts are part of a corpus of responses to a questionnaire on the meaning of NATION AS BODY metaphor
that has been conducted in more than 20 countries with informants from over 40 different linguistic backgrounds
(Musolff, 2016a,b, 2017). The prompting question was: ‘The concept of ‘nation’ can be described byway of ametaphor
or simile that presents it in terms of a human body. Please apply this metaphor to your home nation in 5–6 sentences’.
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Themotivation for the questionnairewas the experience of contrasting responses to an improvised class test in anMA
seminar to check on the recently introduced term ‘body politic’. As themajority of students in the seminar did not have
English as their first language, I tried to ascertain that the new terminology had been understood by asking them to
apply the body politic metaphor to their home country. To my surprise, 50 per cent of responses, which were all given
by Chinese students, looked like this:
(3) Beijing: Heart and Brain, Shanghai: Face (economic center); Hong Kong and Taiwan: Feet; Tianjin: Hands ( = army
close to Beijing); Shenzhen: Eyes (= the first place open to the world).
Reponsesof this latter type,which appear tobegrounded in a TERRITORY-basedunderstandingof the NATION-AS-BODY
metaphor, clearly contrasted with responses of types (1) and (2), which conceptualized the respective home nation as
a BODY (more precisely, HEAD see example 1) or as a PERSON (that is, with personality/character traits, see example 2).
Of course, the concept of a PERSON is not identical with that of a BODY, but across most cohorts at least 10 per cent (in
some cases up to 40%) respondents chose to interpret the BODY metaphor in this way.1
Having found evidence of three-way conceptual variation in the interpretation of the body politic metaphor among
one seminar class, the initial group of students and I developed a simple standardized questionnaire that asked one
question, that is, to apply the BODY-metaphor to one’s home nation, plus social background information about infor-
mants’ first language, nationality, age and sex. With the generous help of colleagues and their students, the question-
naire has been administered to various cohorts of language/communication students at the University of East Anglia,
two other British universities and higher education institutions of over 20 more countries, with informants from over
40 different linguistic backgrounds (Musolff, 2020 forthcoming). Here, we focus on the cohort of Inner Circle English
speakers (n = 183), which comprises samples from the UK, the USA, New Zealand and Australia. Their analysis in sec-
tion 4 of this paperwill bemainly qualitative, to show the range of variationbutwill also include comments on the indica-
tive quantitative findings. In sections 2 and 3we outline the theoretical andmethodological horizon of the analysis.
2 ‘UNIVERSALIST’ VS. ‘RELATIVIST’ POSITIONS IN CONCEPTUAL
METAPHOR THEORY
The ‘classic’ conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) approach, developed since the 1980s by Lakoff, Johnson and others,
has been a oriented towards a universalist stance on metaphorical concepts towards by locating their origins in
‘embodied’, ultimately neurophysiologically-based cross-domain mappings (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Kövecses,
2002, 2015; Lakoff, 1993, 2008; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). Nonetheless, the issue of intra- and cross-cultural
variation of metaphor has been a topic for continuous discussion both in CMT and applied metaphor studies, thanks
to its salience in real-life data of metaphor use (Idström & Piirainen, 2012; Low, Todd, Deignan, & Cameron, 2010;
Musolff, MacArthur, & Pagani, 2014; Sharifian, 2010). The largest overview of culture-specific metaphor variation
from a CMT perspective is Kövecses’ (2005) volume on Metaphor in culture: Universality and variation, in which the
author makes two ‘modifications’ to CMT to accommodate variation phenomena: (1) he stresses that it ‘is complex
metaphors – not primarymetaphors –withwhich people actually engage in their thought in real cultural contexts’, and
(2) he introduces the notion of a ‘main meaning focus’ that metaphors gain in a specific community of speakers (2005,
pp. 11–12). Such a ‘meaning focus’ includes culture-specific source-conceptual material. For instance, the apparently
universal conceptualization of the emotion ANGER (target concept) as a PRESSURISED SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER
(source concept), which has been researched across cultures by Kövecses (1986, 1990, 1995) and others (Matsuki,
1995; Taylor & Mbense, 1998; Yu, 1998), has several distinct semantic manifestations. In English it is expressed by
way of analogy to a fluid but in Chinese by analogy to a gas, and its main locations can be the head (in English), the
belly (in Japanese) or the heart (in Zulu) (Kövecses, 2005, pp. 68–69). The investigation of cultural differences in
conceptualization of emotionally and cognitively central body parts (that is, as the seat of emotional/cognitive agency)
MUSOLFF 3
has been developed further into a typology of ‘abdomino-‘, ‘cardio-‘ and ‘cerebrocentrist’ perspectives (Ibarretxe-
Antuñano, 2012; Sharifian, Dirven, Yu, & Niemeier, 2008). Further variation phenomena can be identified in target
concept application and pragmatic exploitation of conceptual metaphors. For instance, corpus-based research into the
metaphorization of emotions across English, Russian and Spanish has shown that these three languages share some
salient conceptualizations (of which the BODY-based ones are only a part) but also exhibit significant differences in
the ‘appraisal, expression, regulation and the saliency of physiological aspects of anger’ (Ogarkova & Soriano, 2014).
Yu (2008) has demonstrated that the folk-theoretical SOCIAL FACE-metaphor is differentially composed in Chinese
and English, respectively emphasising either the aspects of DIGNITY IS FACE vs. PRESTIGE IS FACE, and MUTUAL vs.
EGOCENTRIC FACE (Jia, 1997; Pan, 2000; Pan &Kadar, 2012;Watts, 2005).
Whilst the modified CMT approach thus allows for cross-cultural variation in principle, its status in the theoretical
model remains unclear. It is left open whether variation in sub-concepts, for example, of varying foci on body parts as
CONTAINERS for emotions (as SUBSTANCES), as in Kövecses’ examples, is based on a basic conceptual difference or is
merely deemed to be a secondary, surface-level differentiation of a more ‘basic’ universal (EXPANDING) SUBSTANCE-
IN-A-CONTAINER source concept. Second, as has been pointed out repeatedly, the universalist bias of CMT is linked
to a concomitant ‘synchronic bias’, that is, a one-sided focus on the semantic motivation of conceptual metaphors
regardless of their diachronic and historical dimension. As Geeraerts and Grondelaers (1995) have highlighted, the
metaphor of EMOTIONS-AS-PRESSURISED FLUIDS IN A CONTAINER, which was initially researched mainly on the basis
of English language data, bears an uncanny resemblance to the traditions of ‘humoral’ medicine and philosophy that
dominated European thought for more than a thousand years and whose terminological traces can still be found
in many modern European languages to this day, such as in the phraseology of ‘choleric, sanguine, phlegmatic and
melancholic temperaments’ (Temkin, 1973). The cultural continuity of these traditions arguably provides at least good
a motivation for the EMOTION-AS-PRESSURISED FLUID IN CONTAINER metaphor as its ahistorical ‘grounding’ in body
temperature sensations.
Further studies have adduced empirical evidence of socio-historical influences on conceptual metaphor devel-
opment. Trim, 2011a,b) has shown that variations in the relative salience of specific versions of the LOVE-AS-FIRE
metaphor in particular socio-historical settings/periods can best be explained and modeled in terms of dynamic con-
ceptual networks, rather than as ever-new iterations of the same experiential mappings. Musolff, 2010a,b) and Shog-
imen (2008) have demonstrated that the historical and cross-cultural variation of the NATION AS BODY metaphor in
European and Japanese discourse communities concerns not only a few sub-concepts (as allowed in themodified CMT
account) but also the basic source framework, that is, the kind of body that is imagined to be the source for nation con-
ceptualizations. Ancient, medieval, earlymodern and present-day concepts of the human body clearly differ in relation
to the popular physiological and medical knowledge available to respective speech communities; hence their applica-
tion as sources for politicalmetaphors also varies –medieval thinkerswould hardly have talked theBritish bodypolitics
‘DNA’, to name just one obvious example.
Even at the synchronic level, evidence of culture-specific ‘relativity’ of metaphorical concepts has been provided
in studies of real-life reception of figurative language in English as Second Language and English as Lingua Franca
contexts. Numerous analyses of English as a lingua franca in secondary and higher education contexts have exposed
hitherto unnoticedmiscommunication due towrongly understood figurative language for the English-basedmetaphor
UNDERSTANDING-AS-SEEING (Littlemore, 2003; Littlemore, Chen, Koester, & Barnden, 2011;MacArthur, Littlemore, &
Krennmayr, 2013; Piquer-Piriz, 2010;Wang &Dowker, 2010), as well as instances of creative adaptation of L2 lexis to
L1 mappings (Heredia & Cieślicka, 2015; Nacey, 2014; Philip, 2010). And in the context of practical intercultural com-
munication, Sharifian (2014), has highlighted clashes between speakers of Standard Australian English and Aboriginal
English: whilst in the latter discourse variety concepts such as LAND, RAIN, MEDICINE are linked to beliefs in ancestor
beings, these links appear in a non-Aboriginal context as merely rhetorical metaphorical mappings that lack any tangi-
ble conceptual content, which can lead to social conflict.
Such diachronic and synchronic variation in metaphor understanding transcends the horizon of classic CMT, which
assumed an ‘automatic’ and largely ‘unconscious’ understanding of metaphor (Gibbs, 1994, 2007; Lakoff, 1993). This
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stance is of course in line with the assumption of universal, neurologically based mappings but is not supported by
real-life data. If it were correct, variation in metaphor understanding would not occur at all or be a negligible super-
ficial phenomenon, for the neurological basis must be assumed to be the same in all humans (excepting pathological
phenomena). But such universality and automaticity only pertains to the general faculty for understanding metaphors
(for humans beyond a certain age), not to specific conceptual structures and cognitive processes. The empirical
evidence of mis- or not understood metaphors as well as of synchronic and diachronic conceptual variation clearly
shows that the ‘automaticity’ claim is restricted to narrowly defined, experimentally set-up focus on the ‘activation
phase’ Giora’s (2003, p. 3) of metaphor comprehension, that is, to the basic recognition of a linguistic structure as
being used in a non-literal sense. However, such initial identification of a structure as ametaphor cannot be deemed to
cover the whole interpretation process, including semantic and pragmatic ‘integration’ (Giora, 2003).
3 CULTURE-SPECIFIC VARIATION IN METAPHOR INTERPRETATION
If differences in figurative conceptualization impact not only the active production or use of metaphors but also their
understanding,we need to developmethods for elicitingmetaphor interpretations that reveal these differences at var-
ious levels of consciousness. Asking informants directly how and/or why they interpret a given metaphor is obviously
not very helpful in itself because it elicits conscious reflection thatmay not reflect at all the informants’ actual (‘psycho-
logically real’) understanding processes but instead involvesmeta-interpretive speculation.On theother hand,muchof
psycholinguistic research on metaphor comprehension (Gibbs, 1994, 2007; Glucksberg, 2008; Katz, 2017; Thibodeau
& Boroditsky, 2011) has concentrated on issues such as the speed of processing, the identification of target referents
or the role of metaphor in achieving specific pragmatic effects (implicatures such as irony, sarcasm an evaluative pref-
erences), without revealingmuch about culture-specific factors. Methodologically, research of this latter dimension of
metaphor is still in its infancy.
The survey with its open request to applying the body metaphor that was mentioned above can be understood as
a first pilot-study towards investigating culture-specific influences on metaphor reception, without laying any claim
to conclusiveness – its data will have to be corroborated by further evidence both from more narrowly focused and
rigorously controlled interpretation experiments as well as from carefully structured interviews, both of which would
provide comparative data to the survey, thus allowing ‘triangulation’ and modeling of the most likely psychologically
plausible reception processes. The survey question itself did not ask explicitly for a metaphor interpretation as such
but instead for applying an explicitly suggestedmetaphor to the ‘home nation’. Its main aimwas to showcase the range
of conceptual variation, and it only yields indirect data on the actual interpretation processes. The responses focused
on fulfilling the task of using the metaphor to describe the target concept, which for all national cohorts was a differ-
ent one. The analysis, on the other hand, concentrated on conceptual-argumentative clusters or ‘scenarios’ (Musolff,
2006) of source concepts, such as the BODY, PERSON and GEOBODY scenarios indicated in the initial examples, and
their distributionwithin the diverse cultural cohorts of informants. Given the samplingmethod, the survey data cannot
be regarded as representative for whole national ‘cultures’ (if these can be presumed at all) but are restricted to a sub-
group of national discourse communities – undergraduate and postgraduate students of language-related degrees at
higher education institutions.
In practical terms, the delivery of the survey questionnaire was guided by a policy of inviting student volunteers to
produce within 5–10minutes a set of answers in class, in order to minimize the possibility of conscious recollection of
pre-learnt figurative concept definitions or theories of the nation state as a human body. The participating colleagues
were asked to avoid giving ‘model answers’ and to give advice only to clarify the task. This policy kept the ratio of
irrelevant answers to a small minority, around 5 per cent of submissions, with a maximum of around 15 per cent in a
few cohorts. The selection of the relevant answers was carried out by the main investigator and two research interns.
The identification of irrelevant answers was usually unproblematic, as they either involved no metaphor at all or a
clearly different one (such as the NATION-AS-SHIP or NATION-AS-HOUSE, or NATION-AS-ANIMAL).
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TABLE 1 Social indicators: Inner Circle English speakers
Gender Female 105 57%
2
Male 78 43%
Age group 18–25 160 88%
26–30 6 3%
31–40 6 3%
41+ 11 6%
Note: Number of valid scripts overall: 183 (= 100%).
TABLE 2 Scenario distribution: Inner Circle English speakers
Scenarios BODY GEOBODY BODYPART PARTOF EGO PERSON
Scenario tokens 103 59 23 2 45
Percentages 44% 25% 10% 1% 20%
Number of scenarios overall: 232 (= 100%).
By comparisonwith the distinction or relevant and irrelevant responses, classifying and coding the conceptual clus-
ters involved more training and discussion for the three analysts. In addition to the BODY, PERSON and GEOBODY sce-
narios, we identified two further distinct conceptualization clusters: that of the nation as a BODY PART (thus presuming
the existence of a larger external BODY), for example, as LEG, HEART or HAIR, or as a PART OF EGO (the informant’s own
body/personality), as in identifying the nation as their ‘own’ BLOOD or HEART. Instead of one identical, only superficially
variable type of metaphor interpretation as presumed in classic CMT, we thus had five types of BODY conceptualiza-
tions for classifying all responses. As the responses varied in length and complexity, they also differed in the number of
scenarios they included: some had only one, some two or three scenarios; a few cases covered four or even five.
4 THE INNER CIRCLE SAMPLE
The sample of responses from informantswith English as their first languagewas collected at seven universities across
Britain, USA, New Zealand, and Australia; it also incorporates responses by English-L1 Inner Circle speakers (from
these countries as well as from Ireland and Canada) in various European universities. Altogether, it includes 183 valid
scripts, of which 59 are by British nationals, 34 by US, 42 by New Zealand, 46 by Australian, 1 by an Irish person and
1 by a Canadian. It would have been desirable to have more balanced national samples but sampling met with varying
practical problems and the ensuing discrepancies in sample sizesmade a balanced comparison impossible. It is thus not
possible to draw a statistically valid comparison between the fourmain ‘national’ Inner Circle sub-cohorts (Britain, US,
New Zealand, Australia) but only to indicate conceptual and pragmatic patterns that are indicative of nation-specific
tendencies in conceptualising one’s own nation as a body. Further research may yet enable us to roughly match the
cohorts and thus achieve a better basis for comparison.
Like all other samples, the Inner Circle sample is (unsurprisingly) characterized by a strong preponderance of 18–
25 year old informants, and by a female majority, which may be due to sampling among language/linguistic-related
university students.
According to the ‘scenario’ categorizationoutlined inTable1, the InnerCircle samplegenerated232scenario instan-
tiations, which show in Table 2.
In the following sections we will discuss the different scenarios, starting with the most frequently represented one
(BODY), thendiscussing the conceptuallymost closely relatedones (BODY PART; PART OF EGO) and thenmovingon to the
GEOBODY and PERSON scenario versions. The latter in particular gives rise to affectively charged conceptualizations as
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well as to further pragmatic effects, e.g. argumentative exploitation and irony, whichwill be of special interest in cross-
cultural comparison.
4.1 The nation as a (whole) body
The BODY scenario clearly dominates the Inner Circle sample. Its implications are that of hierarchy (as in example 1
above) and of interdependency between all the parts of the BODY-whole, as in the following example:
(4) Ahuman bodyonlyworks effectively if all of its individual partswork. For example, a person canonly survive if their
heart/lungs/brain organs are functioning […]. A nation – like Britain – can only function well if all its body parts […]
work together. If one thing gets taken away or isn’t able to voice its opinion, then the body will die or not function
correctly. (E, UK, 21, F)3
In addition to BODY (WHOLE) and the umbrella category ORGANS/BODY PARTS/LIMBS, a further 60 distinct BODY- sub-
concepts and 21 HEALTH/ILLNESS-related sub-concepts can be found across the 380 instances of lexical items from
the combined BODY-HEALTH field, ranging as they do from the BODY-WHOLE to the extremities, inner organs, taboo
areas (ANUS, ARMPIT) and to medical conditions and their treatment. The most frequent lexical fields are: HEAD-
BRAIN (86 instantiations = 23%), HEART (65 instantiations = 17%), BODY(WHOLE)-PARTS/LIMBS/ORGANS (65 instan-
tiations= 17%), BLOOD-VEINS-ARTERIES, ARMS-HANDS and LEG-FEET (each with 20–22 instantiations, that is, between
5–6%).
The most prominent usage pattern is the hierarchical top-down model of the political anatomy from ‘head to toe’,
which is strongly reminiscent of classic body politic definitions since the Renaissance (Dobski & Gish, 2013; Harris,
1998; Harvey, 2007). This model is shared by all Inner Circle groups; themain differences concern the target referents
of the TOP BODY PARTS:
(5) England is an organism. Its head is the Queen, its torso and limbs are the state and government. Its heart is culture
and history, its brain is parliament. Its feet is the economy. (E, UK,M, 25)
(6) The United States of America is like a human body. In fact, we often refer to it as the body politic. The government
of the U.S. is the head, or the brain. It is (supposed to be) in control of the country’s functions. The states are the
various parts of the body, functioning independently, but under the control of the ‘brain. (E, US, F, 48)
(7) The head of the nation is the president and themembers of Congress. (E, US, 20, F)
(8) If New Zealand was a body, the Prime Minister would be the head in control and at the top. The Queen would
be the hair, technically higher, but with no real power. The feet would be our farms, covered in mud but helps
us trudge along, the main source of our momentum. The hands would be our vineyards, full of fruit ripe for the
picking, useful and helpful. (E, NZ, 19, F)
(9) Our head of state [of Australia] is the Englishmonarch. (E, AUS, F, 18)
(10) The federal government [of Australia] is the brain. (E, AUS,M, 18)
Inmany cases HEAD and BRAIN are treated as exchangeable as the hierarchically ‘highest’ parts of the body-whole that
control all other parts. However, where there is a distinction between the ceremonial or nominal head of state and the
politically effective, controlling body part, the latter is accorded the BRAIN function, whereas the former may be the
nominal HEAD or, indeed, a more ephemeral part of the HEAD, as in HAIR (see example 8). Critical stances are taken
mainly vis-à-vis the BRAIN rather than the HEAD for being dysfunctional or even abnormal:
(11) [America’s] brain is bipolar and completely disjointed in themiddle (E, US, 25,M)
(12) […] like Frankenstein [i.e.: Frankenstein’s monster], we have an abnormal brain commanding the body, which is
causing our country to act and react withmore negativity and distastefulness (E, US, 48, F)
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In the British and New Zealand samples, such massive criticism is rare; instead, the well-established BRAIN-HEART
dichotomy, metaphorically juxtaposing reason and emotion) is employed. This comparison introduces implicitly a PER-
SON scenario, to signal a contrast between types of political decision-taking:
(13) The brain and heart [of my nation] don’t always agree with one another, and this conflict is normal (E, UK, 22, F)
(14) New Zealand listens to its heartmore than its brain. (E, NZ, 19,M)
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that the HEART concept is always or mainly used in the proverbial ‘seat of
emotions’ meaning. The majority of target concepts of HEART in the BODY-scenario are in fact either central political
institutions (monarchy, parliament) or the working population who keep the body of the nation alive:
(15) The heart of the nation is the American people. (E, US, 21, F)
(16) The heart of the Australian nation is found in the working class, their ethics and prejudices, transporting these
values and production to every appendage. (E, AUS, 24,M)
An alternative source for the ‘people’ target concept is BLOOD, due to its ubiquity and continuousmovement,which sig-
nals LIVELINESS/VITALITY.Other target concepts for BLOOD are theeconomy, public finances, business andpublic trans-
port (often likened to the VEINS and ARTERIES). The concepts of ARMS, HANDS, LEGS, FEET aswell as EYES are associated
with various ‘executive’ parts and functions of state and society (military, police, secret service, middle class, economy,
workers). One British informant mentioned the long arms […] of the empire (UK, 21, M) but did not specify whether this
was meant as a topical or historical description. Extremities are often listed as LIMBS that are complementary to the
central control part (HEAD-BRAIN/HEART), without further specification. The collective category ORGANS fulfills much
the same function in our texts:
(17) New Zealand works as a collective body in that there are a number of different sectors of society that work like
the different organs of a body in order to function as a whole. (E, NZ, 20, F)
(18) […] a person can only survive if their heart/lungs/brain organs are functioning, […] A nation – like Britain – can only
function well if all its parts, the government, themonarchy, and its inhabitants – work together. (E, UK, 21, F)
ILLNESS/DISEASE and MEDICAL TREATMENT concepts are rare in this sample, amounting as they do altogether to 4 per
cent.4 Both summary references (SICK, AILMENT, SCARS, PAIN) and specific notions such as CANCER, INFECTION and
TRANSPLANT are represented in single figures. They are used to express criticismof parts of the respective nation state,
but mostly in the GEOBODY scenario (see below).
Another vehicle for criticism is that of taboo or ugly BODY PARTS, which also straddles various scenarios. In the
organological and physiological hierarchy there are only a few instances:
(19) The queen sits at the face of the nation, with the flabby, saggy Tory government, as the aged, wrinkled décolletage.
(E, UK, 19, F)
(20) […] the anuswould be the actual workers. While the brain thinks it controls the anus, the most it can do is ask or
demand things to be done (E, NZ, 18,M)
(21) The head is the white guys in charge. They also double as the asshole. (E, NZ, 18, F)
Such drastic and offensive examples are few in number but they show the potential of BODY PART conceptualizations to
support strongly evaluative arguments and even insults.Whilst the target referents aremore or less arbitrarily chosen,
the sources appear to be derived froma ‘stock’ of low-prestige concepts that are entrenched in the everyday discourse,
idioms and taboo subjects of the respective discourse community.
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4.2 The nation as a body part and part of ego
To view one’s own nation as a BODY PART, as in a LIMB or an ORGAN is a perspective taken in one tenth of scenario
instances in the Inner Circle sample. It presents the informant’s nation as either part of a larger body (continent or
world), or as body part that is typical for a particular socio-political function or status. Its applications almost always
carry an explicit or an implicit evaluation. The positive ones highlight useful limbs/organs, such as EYES, HANDS, BRAIN
and HEART (the latter again with its ‘seat of emotions’ symbolism):
(22) […] GB represents the eyes of development […]. (E, UK, 21, F)
(23) America is like the hands of a human body; they are used for work, get dirty often, and when backed in a corner,
are used to fight. (E, US, 20,M)
(24) Australia is like a brain – a bit isolated from the rest of the body, similar to how Australia seems isolated from the
other countries in the world. Similar to how many people move to Australia for new opportunities, the human
brain is full of potential (E, AUS, 18, F)
(25) Our nation is like a beating heart,where pride and passion flow as blood (E, NZ, 20,M)
In the critical/negative cases, the BODY PART chosen to represent the nation is usually ‘low’ in the body hierarchy in
terms of (lack of) importance, height or cultural esteem, which achieves a denigrating, sarcastic effect (especially bear-
ing in mind that it is supposed to be the writer’s own nation):
(26) England is like an appendix, not very significant anymore but can still cause trouble andmake you realise its there if
it wants to. (E, UK, 18,M)
(27) Britain […] is the belly button. A part of previous high value […]. Now an aesthetic part with a lesser importance
than the rest of the body (E, UK, 22,M)
(28) New Zealand can be seen as the Middle toe of the world, while one may not acknowledge or care for it when
removed the balance of the body will simply be off (E, NZ, 19,M)
(29) Australia is the butt of the world, somewhere that seems laughable and sometimes unnoticeable […]. (E, AUS,
18, F)
The US sub-sample contains no comparable satirical BODY PART conceptualizations. However, one US student high-
lighted his nation’s double-edged role world politics by both describing and drawing it as the LOWER BACK of theworld
that can be painful but is indispensable at the same time:
(30) Lower back. You really need it and it is a very key part. It also gives a lot of people pain. Some people feel different
ways about it. You really can’t ignore it andmost things are connected to it (like your legs to the belly) (E, US, 20,M)
(Illustration to Example 30)
Another US respondent’s answer constitutes one of the rare cases where a depiction of one’s own nation as a BODY
PART is followed by a ’conceptually matching’ characterization of neighbouring country, with an ironical slant:
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(31) The first thing that came to mind for the United States was the head. The US in the sole remaining superpower
state (although its influence is declining) making it arguably the most important nation to the rest of the world.
[…] on a lighter note, back homewe call Canada “America’s hat”, where does a hat go but on the head? (E, US, 20,M)
Such a linkage between a BODY PART and matching DRESS ITEM to the relationship between different nation states is
unique in the corpus and may be a spur-of-the-moment invention by the writer. It underlines the potential for BODY
PART concepts to be exploited for creative and ironical statements.
The scenario variant of the NATION AS PART OF THE WRITER’S (EGO’S) OWN BODY is only minimally represented in
the Inner Circle English corpus: there are just two instances, one from the British, one from the Australian cohort, that
is as the FEET on which EGO stands (E, UK, 21, F) or as her HEART (E, AUS, 18, F). Due to its low numbers, this scenario
seems insignificant for Inner Circle cultures, whereas it is significantly more important in other cultural contexts (see
below, section 5).
4.3 The national territory as a geobody
If the nation is viewed as a territorial or geographical BODY whole, the BODY PART concept lends itself to being applied
to particular places or regions, with hierarchical or functional analogies. In the Inner Circle sample, this is not the
dominant scenario but still accounts for one quarter of all scenario uses. Mostly, the capital is seen as HEAD, BRAIN, or
HEART, due to its status as the seat of government and its control function for the rest of the national body.5 London,
Washington, DC, Wellington and Canberra are identified in these ‘top’ locations, often with a second city (Birming-
ham, New York, Auckland, Melbourne) as the complementary central organ, the HEART. Occasionally, rural regions
(Yorkshire in the UK, the Midwest in the US) are associated with HANDS and FEET, on account of agricultural activity.
Some respondents also feel encouraged to declare their allegiance to, or aversion against, specific places and regions:
(32) I was born and bred in the north-east of England, so that’s where I picture as the heart of my home nation. Of
course, the head of state is situated in the south east of England, so that it seems the heart is above the head –
geographically speaking. (E, UK, 27, F)
(33) […] perhaps London is the brain as it seems to bewhere people go towork after study. The real brain is Cambridge,
the best university the country has to offer. Don’t talk about Oxford, that is the fungal nail infection, which we
haven’t got round to treating yet (E, UK, 24,M)
(34) The brain is Auckland. The heart isWellington. (E, NZ, 20,M)
(35) Washington DC is the brain/head/mouth. The legs are the producing states (It keeps the economy going/moving).
Nebraska is the heart. LA is the cancer killing the nation / body. Florida is thewrinkles & parting lines. NewYork is the
adrenaline. (E, US, 42, F)
(36) Canberra is the heart of Australia.New SouthWales is like the hands that craft fine things. (E, AUS, 20,M)
As with nation-as-BODY PART conceptualizations, regional-territorial BODY PARTS can carry implicitly evaluative
notions regarding their status in the body hierarchy, as well in terms of state of health and body aesthetics, many of
whichareexploited for humoristic or polemical effects. These include to characterizationsof regions as ILLNESSES (NAIL
INFECTION, CANCER as in examples 33, 35 above) or as ‘lower’ and taboo BODY PARTS:
(37) The backside of England is Hull (E, UK, 19, F)
(38) […] certain parts of [America] (specifically theupper eastern, but not on the coast) [are] referred to as the “armpit”
of the nation, implying that it is stinky, and gross (E, US, 31, F)
(39) Tasmania is the nether regions of Australia. (E, 19,M)
(40) Canberra is the ass of Australia (E, AUS, 20,M)
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On the other hand, regions can be emphatically and ‘patriotically’ endorsed, most often as the HEART, in the symbolic
sense of the ‘seat’ of the SOUL, of the respective nation:
(41) Britain’s […] heart is in Yorkshire (E, UK, 21, F)
(42) Uluru is the heart of Australia, soulfully connecting us to our surrounds (E, AUS, 18,M)
(43) I grew up in the upper Midwest (Dakotas), and have always known it as “the heartland” for two reasons. First is
that it is in the middle of the country, just as the heart is said to be in the center of the body. I have also heard it in
terms of the fact that the people who live in theMidwest have a lot of heart (E, US, 31, F)
(44) The Gaeltacht is the heart/soul of Ireland (E, Ir, 19, F)
Overall, GEOBODY characterizations serve mainly the function of comparing prominent places/regions and attaching
emotion-laden evaluations to them. The HEAD/BRAIN – HEART distinction is very prominent and often linked explic-
itly with the conventional REASON – EMOTION dichotomy, which favors a positive identification with HEART-status,
whereas BRAIN-function is ascribed varying evaluations.
4.4 The nation as a person
The last scenario to be discussed, that is the personalization of the nation, appears to invite even more evaluative
uses than the BODY PART and GEOBODY scenarios. The positive depictions of the nation’s CHARACTER TRAITS cen-
ter on concepts such as EASY GOING, FRIENDLY and POLITE, the negative ones include HEADSTRONG, MOUTHY, MESSY,
MEASLY, WEAK, PESSIMISTIC.Occasionally, ‘national character’ stereotypes are exploited, as in theUKwith regard to the
national pastimes TEA-DRINKING and QUEUING, which are treated with mild (self-)irony (4 cases, see below, example
46); and in Australia, with regard to alcohol-consumption, allegedly a gallon each second (2 cases, both frommale infor-
mants). In a few instances, such personalized nation-characterization is extended into a mini-narrative that ‘explains’
the origins of the PERSON-quality in question, for example, AGEING and OBESITY for the UK and USA, respectively, and
YOUTH/ADOLESCENCE for the ‘younger’ nations of NewZealand and Australia:
(45) England is an ageing person, one that has been going for a long time. A small framewith big potential. England used
to have many other clothes (colonies) to dress itself in. However, it has since given away all of it’s [sic] clothes. (E,
UK, 18, F)
(46)
(E, UK, 22, F)
(Text and illustration)
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(47) My nation is fat. Lying supine, its head is in the center, as well as its feat [sic]. Its limbs branch like a star. Its fat is a
combination of future pregnancy, a bloaded [sic] past and an uncontrollablemetabolism. (E, US, 25,M)
(48) New Zealand is like a little brother chasing after the nations of the world and clamouring for attention. (E, NZ, 18, F)
(49) Being a relatively new country I would equate Australia to a body during adolescence. Ideologies are developing
and changing at a rapid pace, though not without internal conflict. The brain is exposed to new hormones such as
the older generation of Australia is exposed tomulticulturalism and expected to adjust to it. The parasites are the
people who reject these inclusive notions. (E, AUS, 18, F)
5 DISCUSSION
Our overview over nation conceptualizations produced by informants from Inner Circle societies shows that the BODY
scenario is the dominant one. Its implications of hierarchical structure and interdependence (that is, top-down orienta-
tion, functional andaesthetic hierarchies of life-essential vs. non-essential, ‘superfluous’ and ‘lowly’ organs/limbs) show
ahighdegreeof congruitywithWestern/European traditionsof nation-as-body conceptualizations (HEAD-TO-TOE hier-
archy, Fable of the belly). The BODY-PART scenario fits this pattern, too, and allows authors to comment on aspects of the
body politic that theywant to hold up to praise or ridicule. This pattern also applies to the territorial GEOBODY-scenario,
in which the respective capitals are assigned top status (HEAD, BRAIN or HEART) whilst some places or regions are rel-
egated to the lower regions in the nation-BODY. PART OF EGO examples are only minimally in evidence whereas the
NATION AS PERSON scenario, which accounts for one fifth of all instances, predictably includes the most detailed char-
acterizations. They depict the respective nation in a personal (age-specific) role, with (supposedly) matching ‘typical’
behavior and provide an evaluative commentary that expresses ethical and/or emotional identification or distancing
(see examples 45–49).
When such normatively slanted, personalized depictions are combined with the more implicitly evaluative
BODY/BODY PART conceptualizations for thewhole nation or for territorial or political entities in it, the amount of judg-
mental comment in the Inner Circle responses reveals itself as high: 94 out of 183 questionnaires (51%) contain con-
ceptualizations that depict aspects of the respondents’ home nations in a partly or wholly negative (39 instances), or
an ironically/sarcastically ridiculing (45 instances) or a sympathetic-humorous light (10 instances). This is by far highest
percentage across all cohorts – comparative results for other European andMiddle Eastern cohorts are below 10 per
cent, for Asian cohorts are below 5 per cent! It is also in this group of critical/ironical/humoristic responses that we
can find subtle differences between the distinct national cohorts in the Inner Circle sample, although the imbalance of
sample sizesmakes it difficult to gauge the statistical reliability. The British sub-sample (n= 59), for instance, is charac-
terized by matching amounts of critical and ironical comments (n = 18 for each type) and a minority of four humorous
comments, yielding 40 instances altogether, which is the highest percentage (68%). The ironical remarks are relatively
polite, as exemplified in quotations (19), (26), (27), (33), (37), (45) and (46). Generally, taboo-BODY PART characteriza-
tions are avoided and the criticism is often temperedby a humorous slant. In the smallerUS cohort (n=34), the number
of relevant examples is 17, yielding a percentage of 50 per cent. Here the criticism ismore stringent and sarcastic, with
references to bipolar brain function, Frankenstein-like features and deadly cancer threatening the body politic (examples
11, 12, 35). The New Zealand sample (n = 42) has 14 relevant examples ( = 33%), the majority of which are creative,
humorous references to the nation as inexperienced (young girl/boy), and as being emotional rather than rational and
of uncertain status, as in examples (2), (14), (28), (48). The 23 examples in the Australian cohort (n = 46) amount to
a matching 50 per cent but are characterized by a predilection for taboo parts and drastic conceptualizations (butt,
nether regions, ass, parasites, see examples 29, 39, 40, 49). The latter sub-concepts, which also occur in the three other
Inner Circle cohorts, albeit to a lesser extent, are highly distinctive in the whole corpus: in several of the quantitatively
larger linguistic/cultural cohorts (German and Chinese, both more than 300 scripts) they do not appear at all. Again,
it must be stressed that due to the statistical imbalance, the percentages reported have only indicative significance,
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but they seem to indicate register differences that may be characteristic of conceptualizing national identity among
18–25 year old academically trained young adults in the four different countries. These characterizations are clearly
evaluative and partly humorous/ironical in that they highlight problematic aspects of the nation’s history and poli-
tics (for example, loss of international importance, difficult relationships with other nations, internal social conflicts
through immigration) by depicting them as personal shortcomings.
6 CONCLUSION
The observed preferences in conceptualizing one’s home nation from Inner Circle Englishes only represent a small sec-
tion of the metaphor interpretation corpus. It comprises comparable samples of L1-users from 13 other European L1
backgrounds andanother five fromnon-EuropeanL1backgrounds (Chinese, Japanese,Arabic, Turkish,Hebrew),which
altogether include more than 1,200 responses. The comparative value of the English Inner Circle sample is of course
only visible in contrast with other cohorts, whose presentation would go beyond the remit of this article. Preliminary
results for the other cohorts (Musolff, 2020 forthcoming), indicate that, for instance, the German-L1 sample has an
even more pronounced preference for the BODY scenario (55%), the Chinese (Mandarin and Cantonese)-L1 sample is
characterized by a preponderance of PERSON conceptualizations (34%) and a relatively high percentage for GEOBODY
scenario instances (28%). The Arabic-L1 sample, on the other hand, combines the already in themselves strongly rep-
resented PART OF EGO and PERSON-scenarios (36% and 37%, respectively) to express an emphatic identification of
Self and nation. In terms of polarity this tendency is predominantly positively (patriotically) slanted but also includes a
strand of stringent nation-as-self critique. Themotivating factors for these different tendencies are still to be explored
but can be sought in conceptual traditions, including religious and philosophical backgrounds, idioms, proverbs and
other culturally important discursive traditions (such as the religious discourse which seems to play almost no role in
the Inner Circle sample) as well as in historically or topically salient political/ideological issues.
At the methodological and theoretical level, the findings demonstrate (a) that there is substantial variation in the
comprehension and interpretation of the NATION-AS-BODY metaphor and (b) that such variation can be elicited by a
task that allows informants to articulate their comprehension in response to an open-ended question rather than a
narrowly circumscribed, experimental setting that reduces the complex process of understanding to immediate stim-
ulus reactions measurable in micro-seconds (identification of metaphoricity, or a target referent or a continuation
preference), as it has been dominant in psycholinguistic research geared towards confirming cognitive assumptions
about universality and automaticity of metaphor comprehension (see Section 2). Such experimental set-ups certainly
are legitimate for measuring initial phases of understanding but cannot do justice to the full, socio-culturally informed
interpretation potential of respondents. The preliminary findings presented here show that even among Inner Circle
English speakers,metaphor interpretation is not amatter of automatically and subconsciously applying one conceptual
model but that they are fundamentally characterized by variation, whose patterns can be related to cultural traditions,
such as popular discourses informed by the body politic metaphor in the English-speaking world. Its study in world
Englishes contexts, which have also other, Outer and Expanding Circle, cultural traditions as inputs, can elucidate the
origins of such variation patterns and contribute to intercultural learning, for example, to avoid cross-cultural miscom-
munication and enable mutual cognitive enrichment.
NOTES
1 This result shows the close connection of the two metaphor sources (as also reflected in the body politic concept, which has
often been endowedwith ‘personal’ features, such as ethical, gendered and ‘typical’ life-style attributes (see for instance the
well nation-personalizations of John Bull for Britain,Uncle Sam for the USA).
2 Percentages here and in all other tables are rounded figures.
3 Italicisation of the relevantmetapohorical terms in this and further exampleswas addedby the author. Square brackets signal
omissions or explanatory additions by the author. No other changes were made, so spelling and grammatical errors remain
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as in the originals. The abbreviations at the end of each quotation signify the sociolinguistic indicators supplied by the infor-
mants (first language, nationality, gender, age).
4 Highlighting healthiness is very rare, with just three instances altogether, one of which accounts for the Canadian contribu-
tion: ‘Canada is like a healthy body. […] the numerous areas become strong and allows [sic] the country toworkwell as awhole,
i.e. political, sporting and international representation’ (E, Can, 19,M).
5 The ‘control’ function is not necessarily seen as fully functional; so one US student characterizes Washington D.C. as the
‘undecisive [sic] brainwho argues against itself all the time’ (E, US, 20, F). See also example (33), for differentiation between
the nominal brain and the ‘real’ one.
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